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hy do we bother, in Europe, about ‘Islamic 
radicalisation’? The answer seems obvious. 
There are at least two good reasons: one is 
terrorism, with its security implications; the other is the 
issue of integrating second-generation migrants in 
Europe, apparently the most fertile ground for recruiting 
terrorists. For most observers, the link between terrorism 
and integration is a given fact. Al Qaeda-type terrorist 
activities carried out either in Europe, or by European 
residents and citizens abroad, are seen as the extreme 
form, and hence as a logical consequence, of Islam-
related radicalisation. There is a teleological approach 
consisting of looking in retrospect at every form of 
radicalisation and violence associated with the Muslim 
population in Europe as a harbinger of terrorism.  
This approach is problematic, not so much because it 
casts a shadow of suspicion and opprobrium on Islam as 
a religion and on Muslims in general, but because it fails 
to understand the ‘roots of violence’ and it arbitrarily 
isolates ‘Muslim’ violence from the other levels of 
violence among European youth. This, in turn, has two 
negative consequences: it does not allow us to understand 
the motivations for violence among people joining Al 
Qaeda (who are far from being, as we shall see, devoted 
Muslims fighting for their Middle Eastern brothers), and 
it unduly concentrates on “what is the problem with 
Islam”, precisely playing on Al Qaeda’s own terms, and 
spawning a debate that will have little or no impact 
among the segments of the population who are 
susceptible to joining Al Qaeda. As we shall see, 
comparing good Islam to bad Islam does not make sense, 
not because Islam is all bad or all good, but because the 
process of violent radicalisation has little to do with 
religious practice, while radical theology, as salafisme, 
does not necessarily lead to violence. 
Any counter-terrorist policy has to be based on an 
analysis of the roots of terrorism. If not, such a policy 
could not only be ineffective, but also counter-
productive, by inducing some of the phenomena it claims 
to combat. 
Roughly speaking, there are two approaches: one vertical, 
one horizontal. The vertical approach involves 
establishing a genealogy of radicalisation from the Koran 
and the first Islamic community to the present Islamist 
radicals, going through radical theology (Ibn Taymiyya), 
ideologisation (Hassan al Banna and the Muslim 
brothers) and the history of Middle Eastern conflicts, 
from Bonaparte’s campaign in Egypt to the present 
conflicts in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. This 
approach tends to lump together all kind of violence 
linked with Muslim populations, for example ethno-
cultural tensions affecting migrants (crimes of honour), 
petty delinquency and terrorism. The horizontal 
approach, by contrast, consists of putting the ‘leap into 
terrorism’ into the context of the contemporary 
phenomena of violence affecting our societies in general, 
and specifically youth. The two approaches are not 
exclusive of course, but I will argue that the link between 
them is to be understood less in sociological and political 
terms than in terms of a narrative. The success of Osama 
Bin Laden is not to have established a modern and 
efficient Islamist political organisation, but to have 
invented a narrative that could allow rebels without a 
cause to connect with a cause. 
We examine the two views below. 
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1.  The debate on the roots of terrorism 
The vertical approach 
Al Qaeda is a revolutionary organisation in the 
continuation of the Middle Eastern Islamist movements 
(Muslim Brothers, Said Qotb, Ayman al Zawahiri). Its 
strategy is defined by a precise ideology: to topple the 
existing regimes in the Middle East and replace them 
with a Caliphate based on sharia law. Hence the political 
radicalisation is part of a process of theological 
radicalisation, known as salafisme. Islam is at the core of 
Al Qaeda legitimacy and thinking. It plays on the 
nostalgia of the Muslim community for a Golden Age. 
Ideology is the key: people join Al Qaeda because they 
share its ideology and political goals. Indoctrination is the 
basis of recruitment: militants do read books and leaflets, 
even if they use the internet more than the street corner 
bookshop. Conflicts in the Middle East are at the core of 
the ‘Muslim wrath’; Muslims living in Europe do identify 
with their oppressed brothers of the greater Middle East. 
To counter Al Qaeda, one should address the political 
grievances of the sympathisers. Whatever different 
conceptions exist about a settlement of conflicts in the 
Middle East, there will be no de-radicalisation without 
improving the situation in the Middle East. A global war 
on terrorism makes sense because similar trends and 
ideas are at work among most of the Muslims involved in 
local as well as global conflicts.  
This vertical approach is at present largely dominant 
among politicians, journalists and experts of the Middle 
East. It can lead to two different conceptions, both based 
on the premises of the clash of civilisations theory. The 
first assumes that there is a definitive gap between Islam 
and the West, and the only policy is ‘authoritarian 
integration’ (banning the burqas and even the veil, 
enforcing acculturation, limiting religious freedom). 
Personalities as different as Daniel Pipes, Fadela Amara, 
Fritz Bolkenstein and far rightists are on this line. The 
second approach is to promote ‘good Islam’, through the 
so-called ‘dialogue of civilisation’, bringing together 
Western thinkers and Middle East religious authorities, as 
well as European authorities and Muslim community 
leaders, and promoting some sort of multi-culturalism or 
‘reasonable accommodation’, in order to try to establish a 
common ground between East and West. The ‘Alliance 
of civilisations’ project and the interfaith conferences 
recently promoted by the Saudi government are along 
these lines. 
The horizontal approach 
This approach is based on the analysis of the individual 
biographies and trajectories of people who have been 
actually involved in terrorist activities in the West or who 
left the West to perpetrate terrorist activities in the 
Middle East. It concludes that the vertical approach does 
not help to understand the process of radicalisation, and 
considers it more productive to establish a transversal 
comparison between the different forms of violence 
existing among the various milieus that could support 
terrorists. It tends to downplay the impact of Middle 
Eastern conflicts and Islamic religious radicalisation. The 
arguments run as follows:  
•  There is a break between Al Qaeda and the 
traditional Islamists movement: Al Qaeda has no real 
political programme of establishing a territorial 
Islamic state based on sharia. There is a clear gap 
between islamo-nationalism (Hamas, Hezbollah, 
Iran) and the global de-territorialised jihad of Al 
Qaeda. AQ’s references to Islam are for the sake of 
creating a narrative, not of establishing a genuine 
political agenda. Ayman Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s 
deputy, is an exception (the only AQ member coming 
from the elite of the Muslim Brothers) and is unduly 
seen as the ideologist of Al Qaeda. 
•  Instead of promoting a territorial Caliphate in the 
Middle East, Al Qaeda is committed to a global 
struggle against the world power (the US) in the 
continuation of the radical anti-imperialist struggles 
of the 1960s and 1970s (Che Guevara, the Baader-
Meinhof gang). It stresses political activism and 
addresses a wider audience than just the Muslim 
community (hence the converts).  
•  Al Qaeda does not play a vanguard or a leading role 
in the conflicts of the Middle East, but is trying to 
impose its own agenda even against the local 
Islamists (Hamas). There are continuous tensions 
between internationalist fighters and local insurgents 
in Iraq, Afghanistan and even Lebanon. 
•  The West should address the different Middle 
Eastern conflicts from a political perspective (a 
struggle for territorial control from different actors) 
and not by ascribing to them an ideological 
perspective (Caliphate and sharia). 
•  Ideology plays little role in the radicalisation of the 
jihadist internationalist youth: they are attracted by a 
narrative not an ideology. 
•  The process of radicalisation is to be understood by 
putting it into perspective with the other forms of 
violence among European youth. 
•  Any process of de-radicalisation should address 
youth populations, and not an elusive Muslim 
community, which is more constructed (particularly 
by government policies and by self-appointed 
community leaders) than real. 
This perspective is undoubtedly a minority view. But it is 
finding more ground among police and intelligence 
practitioners, who now have an important database of 
radicals coming from or acting in Europe, and see the 
discrepancy between the individual profiles of the 
radicals and the motivations that are attributed to them 
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If we adopt the first version, the Middle East is at the 
centre of the process of radicalisation and hence should 
be at the centre of the de-radicalisation policy. There is 
no real difference between islamo-nationalists and de-
territorialised movements such as Hamas on the one hand 
and internationalist jihadists of Al Qaeda on the other. 
We should study radicalisation essentially from the top 
down: How do ideas and propaganda spread from AQ 
headquarters to would-be radicals? What is AQ’s strategy 
of recruiting? In this sense the young radicals are picked 
and manipulated by the organisation. 
If we adopt the other view, we should, as a necessary first 
step, delink territorialised and nationalist conflicts from 
supra-national jihadism, both in the Middle East (such a 
policy has been the basis of the surge strategy initiated by 
General Petraeus in Iraq) and in Europe (by stopping the 
mixing-up of radicalisation and the Middle East). We 
should also acknowledge that ideology has little to do 
with radicalisation. We should study radicalisation 
essentially at the individual level, addressing the reasons 
why young people who are not linked with a given 
conflict would join AQ. The main de-radicalisation 
objective is to destroy Al Qaeda’s narrative, not to 
provide an ideological or theological alternative, because 
both dimensions (ideology and theology) are simply not 
relevant. 
Is there a general concept of terrorism? 
The general category of ‘terrorists’ or ‘suicide bombers’ 
is not very helpful. We should put terrorist actions into 
their political and strategic contexts.  
If we consider terrorist activities in the Muslim world, 
there is clearly a difference between territorialised 
violence (Palestine, Chechnya) and de-territorialised 
violence (Al Qaeda). The first is linked with a struggle 
for national liberation and is part of a broader use of 
politically motivated violent means with a precise 
objective: to free a territory from what is perceived as a 
foreign occupation. This violence does not spill over in 
other countries except occasionally into the territory of 
the occupying country. It goes along with other forms of 
violence (from intifada to guerilla warfare) and is hinged 
on a precise political agenda; the violence thus could be 
suspended or triggered according to the circumstances 
and the expected results. 
By contrast, global terrorism is defined by the following 
criteria: 
•  The terrorist action is not part of a broader spectrum 
of political and military actions; it is relatively 
isolated from the local political context. 
•  There is no concrete political agenda (although there 
might be, as we shall discuss, a strategy of 
confrontation with the dominant power). 
•  Terrorists are not rooted in a given society (even if 
they are integrated): they don’t fight in their country 
of origin (with the possible exception of Saudi 
Arabia), and they have no or little background of 
militancy or participation in communal works. They 
are often circulating between three countries: country 
of origin of their family, country of residence and 
radicalisation and country of action, although the last 
two could coincide (the London bombings in 2005). 
2.  Al Qaeda as a global de-territorialised 
movement 
The first and probably more common explanation of 
radicalisation, as we saw, is to understand it as a 
consequence of the conflicts in the Middle East, and of 
the sense of humiliation they create among Muslims. But, 
if we refer to the bios of terrorists from Europe, it is clear 
that the motivating factor for violence is not based on 
personal humiliation or oppression experienced by the 
terrorists. There is an almost radical discrepancy between 
the map of the actual conflicts in the Middle East and the 
map of recruitment. Terrorists operating in the West are 
home-grown terrorists. When they have a foreign familial 
or personal background, it is North Africa, Pakistan, East 
Africa, the Caribbean islands or just … Europe. There is 
also a significant proportion of converts. Al Qaeda is not 
only the sole ‘Islamic’ political organisation to have a 
very high level of converts (estimates range from 9 to 
20%), but it is the only one to give them positions of 
responsibility (both Muslim Brothers and the Islamic 
revolution of Iran attracted some converts, but none of 
them was ever to be found in a position of responsibility; 
Hizb ut-Tahrir has many converts but, until now, none is 
in the leadership). Let’s mention the French Christophe 
Caze, Jean-Marc Grandvisir, Jérôme Courtailler and the 
German Christian Ganczarski (Djerba attack in 2002), 
and more recently the Frenchman Willie Brigitte (tried in 
2007 in Paris), the British Yeshi Girma (born in 
Ethiopia), wife of a man convicted for the 21 July 2005 
failed attempt in London, the British Andrew Rowe 
(arrested in 2005) and Dhiren Barot, the Dutch (and 
former policewoman) Martine van der Oeven, member of 
the Hofstadt group, Abdallah Andersen sentenced in 
Copenhagen (2008), Fritz Gelowicz, arrested in Germany 
in 2007, Anthony Garcia (also known as Rahman 
Benouis), sentenced in 2007 in London, and Pascal 
Cruypeninck, sentenced in 2008  in Brussels. Many 
converts are of Caribbean origin (French and British): 
they find in the Islamist milieus a fraternity free from 
racism and may recast the anti-racist and anti-colonial 
struggle in ‘Islamic’ terms; within Al Qaeda they achieve 
positions of responsibility that they would not have 
access to elsewhere. We may mention Grandvisir, 
Brigitte, Jermaine Lindsay (London 2005) or Abu 
Izzadeen (born Trevor Brooks) (sentenced in April 2008 
by a British court). Here traditional anti-imperialism 
merges with Islamism.  
The Europeans in Al Qaeda tend to take one of two 
routes to conversion: there are those who have pursued a 
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mosque, and those who followed their Muslim ‘buddies’, 
when, often after a story of petty crimes, they decide to 
‘go for action’, usually under the influence of a group 
leader, seen as a guru. The ‘group effect’, as Marc 
Sageman
1 calls it, is far more effective in terms of 
triggering radicalisation than reading propaganda books. 
Dhiren Barot, born a Hindu from parents who left East 
Africa to settle in Great Britain, and who went to 
Kashmir, married a Malay woman from Thailand and 
was involved in different plots both in London and New 
York, embodies the perfect example of the de-
territorialised jihadist. A remarkable case is that of the 
Belgian Muriel Degauque (who carried out a suicide 
bombing in Iraq with her husband in 2005), for it signals 
a recent development: the arrival of a generation of 
women in Al Qaeda, which until now has tended to be 
misogynistic (which shows that the converts also bring 
another form of deculturation). 
Interestingly enough, very few Western Muslims from 
Iraqi or Palestinian origin are involved, not only in 
terrorist actions perpetrated in Europe, but also in their 
countries of origin (the argument that it is because they 
are fighting in their own country does not make sense: 
during the 1970s, Palestinians were heavily involved in 
international terrorism). By the same token the jihadists 
who travelled inside the Middle East to fight in Iraq are 
presently mostly Saudis and North Africans (including 
Libyans), and not people who have experienced a direct 
Western form of aggression. Furthermore Al Qaeda has 
seldom attacked Israeli or Jewish targets (contrary to 
more ‘secular’ Palestinian movements like Abu Nidal), 
with of course some exceptions (Istanbul and 
Casablanca). And finally, with the exception of some 
Pakistanis, no second-generation radicalised Muslim has 
gone back to the country of origin of his or her family to 
fight a local jihad. 
To sum up, the process of radicalisation in Europe is not 
a direct consequence of the conflicts in Middle East, 
although these conflicts are re-interpreted through the 
‘narrative’ of Al Qaeda. 
I consider that a dominant characteristic of Al Qaeda’s 
type of violence is de-territorialisation: specific conflicts 
play a role only as narratives and not as geo-strategic 
factors; the radicals are not involved in actual conflicts, 
but in an imaginary perception of the conflicts. The de-
territorialisation factor might also explain new forms of 
radicalisation among Middle Eastern Muslims. The third 
generation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon for 
instance (insurgents of the Nahr al Barid camp in 
Northern Lebanon) have experienced a process of de-
Palestinisation; they are no more geared towards 
Palestinian politics, have no hope of ever coming back, 
but did not receive a new identity or citizenship in 
exchange. They may jump from a desperate national 
                                                      
1 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 
Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia University Press, 2004. 
struggle into identification with the global ummah. The 
phenomena may happen in Palestine itself because the 
hope to achieve a viable statehood is receding (as 
illustrated by the unexpected breakthrough of the Hizb-ul 
Tahrir party in the West Bank in 2007-08, for which the 
Caliphate is more important than the nation-state). 
Al Qaeda’s senior figures, grassroots cells, transnational 
networks and chain of command are thus rooted in 
personal bonds, forged either in Afghanistan or at the 
local level in the West, and which are then transposed to 
a transnational, ‘de-territorialised’ dimension (trips, 
moving to other countries, multiple nationalities, etc.). 
The West is the key place of radicalisation. Interestingly 
enough, many of the North Africans involved in radical 
violence in North Africa had at a time a project of 
migration to Europe. An FBI team sent to Kabul in 2001 
to fingerprint all arrested insurgents made a surprising 
discovery: hundreds of arrested people in Afghanistan 
who were supposed to be local fighters (1% of the total) 
were already in the FBI's database for arrests ... in the 
US. Many arrests were for drunken driving, passing bad 
checks and traffic violations. That means that there were 
probably a far higher percentage of arrested ‘insurgents’ 
who went through the US without being arrested, and that 
the already arrested guys had ‘normal’ delinquency, not 
related to Islam.
2 
A second factor supposed to explain international 
terrorism (after the reaction against the conflicts in the 
Middle East) is Al Qaeda’s strategy and ideology, 
embodied in the ‘far enemy/near enemy theory’. It 
defines Al Qaeda as the ultimate stage of an ongoing 
Islamist revolutionary movement that strived to create 
Islamic states in Muslim countries, and then to establish a 
Caliphate based on sharia. The subsequent failure to 
establish an Islamic state in a given country (whatever the 
reason: pressure of imperialism, lack of support among 
the population, strength of the ruling regimes or 
acknowledgement that utopia does not work) is supposed 
to have pushed the Islamists to go ‘global’, leading to the 
prevalence of the ummah on the nation, and putting jihad 
against the West on the forefront, because there was no 
way to defeat the near enemy (the Arab regimes) as long 
as the distant enemy was not checked or destroyed. Jihad 
is defined as a personal compulsory duty.  
But in fact few of the present radicals have been involved 
in domestic Islamic radical activities in their country of 
origin (with the notable exception of Ayman al 
Zawahiri). Bin Laden himself turned against the Saudi 
monarchy after joining the global jihad. Meanwhile the 
strategy of AQ is to entrap US troops in protracted local 
conflicts and to parasite these local conflicts, without 
defining a coherent political strategy to attract the local 
population. There is no political blueprint from Al Qaeda 
                                                      
2 Ellen Nakashima, “Post-9/11 Dragnet Turns Up Surprises: 
Biometrics Link Foreign Detainees To Arrests in U.S.”, 
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on what to do the day after. They just don’t care. The 
testimonies of the volunteers who joined Al Qaeda show 
that they go for jihad and martyrdom, not to create an 
Islamic State or impose sharia. 
We tend to over-ideologise Al Qaeda in order to 
understand its attractiveness. 
Although a study of the takfiri and jihadi thought 
certainly has its interest, it does not explain the personal 
radicalisation phenomena (even if it might provide an 
aftermath rationalisation),  
To my knowledge, none of the arrested terrorists or 
suspects had Zawahiri or other books in their house, 
while they often have handbooks on how to make bombs 
or videos about ‘atrocities’ perpetrated against Muslims. 
Contrary for instance to the Hizb ut-Tahrir members, who 
always formulate their positions in elaborate ideological 
terms, Al Qaeda’s members do not articulate before or 
after having been caught a political or an ideological 
stand (most of AQ suspects keep silent or deny any 
involvement during their trial, a very unusual attitude for 
political militants, who traditionally transform their trial 
into a political tribune). We should certainly not discard 
entirely the fact that some quarters in Al Qaeda are 
writing or thinking in terms of ideology, but this does not 
seem to be the main motivation for joining Al Qaeda. 
A third explanation puts alienation at the core of the 
radicalisation process. There is certainly some truth in 
that, but the problem is how to define alienation. The 
socio-economic definition (deprivation, poverty, racism, 
social exclusion) is not supported by data. We find 
people from all backgrounds in Al Qaeda: engineers, 
former drug-addicts, social workers ... The fringes from 
where the radicals come are not socio-economic. Another 
definition of alienation is based on the clash of cultures: 
the radicals become violent because they are torn 
between two cultures. 
This ethno-cultural approach is reflected in the 
association of terrorism and crimes of honour under the 
label of ‘Islam-related violence’. Notwithstanding the 
fact that ‘crimes of honour’ are a paradoxical proof of 
integration (they show that young Muslim girls no longer 
abide by traditional rules), there is no correlation between 
them and political radicalisation. Crimes of honour are 
always strictly connected with the ethnic (and often 
tribal) background: perpetrators are mainly Anatolian 
Turks (mostly Kurds) and rural Pakistanis, and involve 
very few North Africans, urban Turks, or Arabs from the 
Near East. Except for Pakistanis, there is no connection 
between the map of honour crimes and the map of 
political radicalisation. Moreover honour crimes are an 
endeavour to restore the ‘integrity’ of the family or of the 
clan; they usually involve a tight-knit family, where sons 
obey their parents. On the contrary, joining Al Qaeda is 
usually a posture of defiance towards parents and 
traditional family. Matrimonial patterns among Al Qaeda 
members are relatively modern: there is little difference 
in age between spouses, spouses choose each other, one 
often marrying a convert or the sister of comrades in 
arms, but never a cousin chosen by the family. In the 
group responsible for the Madrid attack, Serhane Fakhet 
married his friend Mustapha Maymouni’s sister in 2002. 
In France, Jamel Beghal married Johan Bonte’s half-
sister. Malika al Aroud, widow of Abdessatar Dahmane, 
the murderer of commandant Masud in Afghanistan, is a 
good example: she previously bore a daughter out of 
wedlock, married a Tunisian, while she was a Moroccan-
born Belgian; after the death of her husband, she married 
Moez Garsalloui, a man younger than her, whom she met 
through the internet; they live in Switzerland. While 
perfectly westernised (she writes and speaks in French 
and does not know Arabic), she behaves as a modern 
militant of a cause, but more as a dissident from inside 
the Western society than as a representative of a 
traditional Muslim culture. 
Clearly, pro-Al Qaeda’s radicalisation process is not 
linked with the outspoken condemnation of Western 
sexual liberalisation that is pervasive among conservative 
Muslim circles: homosexuality, co-education, sexual 
promiscuity (swimming pools), specific teachings (sexual 
education, biology) are never part of the agenda of Al 
Qaeda. Not to mention the fact that this rejection of loose 
morality is also on the agenda of many non-Muslim 
religious communities. AQ recruits are not specifically 
puritanical and often live or have lived the usual life of 
western teenagers. 
3.  Al Qaeda as a violent youth movement 
In fact it is more productive to understand Al Qaeda in 
Europe as a youth movement, which shares many factors 
with other forms of dissent, either political (the ultra-
left), or behavioural: the fascination for sudden suicidal 
violence as illustrated by the paradigm of random 
shootings in schools (the ‘Columbine syndrome’).  
The generational dimension is obvious: most of the 
radicals have broken with their families or become 
estranged. They define for themselves what should be the 
principles of their lives. They never refer to traditions or 
to traditional Islam, they don’t mention fatwas from 
established clerics. They act on an individual basis and 
outside the usual community bonds (family, mosques and 
Islamic associations). They usually remain aloof from the 
communal group. The group effect concerns the ‘small 
group’: the process of radicalisation takes place in the 
framework of a small group of friends (they knew each 
other before, used to have a common place of meeting: 
campus, local neighbourhood, networks of petty 
delinquency, etc…). Many travelled together to 
Afghanistan. It is a movement of age peers, not based on 
hierarchy.  
A ‘transversal’ approach (comparing youth violence 
among non-Muslims with Al Qaeda recruitment) sheds 
much light on the present process of radicalisation among 
youth, and seems more fruitful than a vertical approach in 
terms of Islamic intellectual legacy (from the Koran to 6 | Olivier Roy 
Sayyid Qotb, through Ibn Taymiyya). Instead of looking 
vertically through Muslim history and theology to explain 
Al Qaeda’s violence, one should connect it to the general 
phenomena of radical violence among youth.  
The leap to violence is not the result of a long process of 
indoctrination and maturation. We have already noted the 
predominance of activism on ideological and intellectual 
formation: there is a very short time between religious re-
conversion and passage to violent action. Violence is at 
the core of the fascination for Al Qaeda. 
We underline below three aspects of this transversal 
fascination for violence. 
i) The recasting of a traditional leftist anti-
imperialism into Islamic terms 
AQ is an avatar of the ultra-leftist radicalism. Its targets 
are the same as the traditional targets of the ultra-left: US 
imperialism, symbols of globalisation. When Bin Laden 
referred to Vietnam in his video speech of September 
2007, instead of quoting the Koran, he was in fact 
addressing an audience more sensitive to the political 
dimension than to the religious one. When AQ executed 
western hostages in Iraq, it staged the execution by using 
the same mise en scène invented by the Red Brigades 
when they killed Aldo Moro. 
The continuity is indicated by the map of recruitment of 
radicals in France. The map of radicalisation does not 
really fit with that of the Muslim population. As 
expected, there are many radicals coming from the 
Parisian suburbs, Lille/Roubaix/Tourcoing and Lyon, 
where there is a huge Muslim population. But why are 
there so few radicals coming from Grenoble and 
Marseille, where there is also a huge Muslim population? 
There has been a tradition of leftist radicalism in the first 
three places mentioned, which did not really exist in 
Marseille. Nevertheless Grenoble was also a centre of the 
ultra-left (Maoists and Action Directe). Why are there so 
few young Muslim radicals coming from Grenoble? In 
fact there is a lot of violence related to second-generation 
Muslims in Grenoble, but it is linked with organised 
crimes, not with the usual petty delinquency. The issue of 
the link between Islamic radicalisation and youth 
delinquency, although far from being systematic, should 
nevertheless be approached a bit more in depth. 
ii) A delinquent generation? 
There is a clear connection between radicalisation and 
petty delinquency, but not with ‘high’ organised crime. 
Many radicals have a background of drug addiction and 
delinquency. Jamal Ahmidan, a mastermind of the 
Madrid bombings, was a drug dealer (and a womaniser); 
many of his accomplices from Morocco were also 
delinquents. It is also a common pattern for many 
converts, who have ambivalent feelings towards 
conversion or a return to religious practice. On one hand, 
it is a way to redeem oneself, but on the other hand, ties 
are not severed with the less religious-minded former 
gang members, who are used to find money and logistical 
support. It is well known that in European jails, second-
generation Muslims are overrepresented and may 
constitute the absolute majority of the inmates, which 
explains why jails are probably the best recruiting field, 
including for converts. But on the other hand, it should be 
kept in mind that Muslims are not responsible for the 
worst crimes: serial killings, mafia-related murders and 
armed robberies are more often perpetrated by whites 
than by Muslims. The generational phenomenon is 
obvious in these differential patterns of delinquency. But 
the more second-generation Muslims are aging, the more 
they tend to integrate ‘hard’ delinquency, but this time at 
the expense of their political engagement. 
This may have unexpected consequences. Paradoxically, 
the formation of ethnic mafias used to be associated with 
integration, as illustrated in the US during the first half of 
the 20
th century. When second-generation migrants join 
organised crime, they are less tempted by political 
radicalisation. If we go back to the example of Grenoble 
and Marseille, the lack of political radicalisation may be 
linked with the rise of an ethnic organised crime, where 
young (well, less and less!) North Africans are involved: 
they are superseding the traditional Corsican and Italian 
gangs. Grenoble is presently (2007-08) the scene of a 
high-level and bloody mafia war involving second-
generation North Africans: the field of potential violence 
is taken by non-political forms of radicalisation. By 
contrast, elsewhere in France, second-generation 
Muslims are more involved in petty delinquency and thus 
remain in the floating margins of society. But we should 
add a caveat: in all these sorts of deviant violence 
(organised crimes, petty delinquency, terrorism), the 
involved groups are never entirely ‘ethnic’: mixed 
ethnicity is a general pattern, although there is usually a 
dominant ethnic pattern.  
iii) Individual suicidal violence 
A third category of transversal violence is the sudden 
leap into suicidal violence, as illustrated by the 
Columbine syndrome, i.e. the random killing by a student 
of schoolmates and teachers in his school, before 
shooting himself or being shot. There are many patterns 
in common with radical terrorists: a possible history of 
drug addiction, a lack of social life, the fabrication of a 
narrative through the internet, the recording of a video 
before taking action, search for fame, use of the internet, 
the attribution of a collective responsibility to the 
targeted random victims. In fact, the stress put on Al 
Qaeda by politicians, media and public opinion is 
probably concealing the increase of a more diluted 
phenomenon of youth terrorism (as illustrated by radical 
animal defence groups). The figure of the lone terrorist is 
more and more pervasive (as illustrated by the 
Frenchman who almost killed himself while making 
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But there remains a question: if there are common roots 
and patterns to explain a phenomenon of generational 
violence that is pervasive in the West, why do many 
youngsters choose jihad and not the other forms? More 
precisely, why do some who choose political violence, 
instead of re-creating ultra-leftist movements, join 
precisely Al Qaeda? It is because AQ provides a 
powerful narrative. 
Al Qaeda provides not so much an ideology as a 
narrative. The first part of the narrative is the suffering of 
the ummah. But this ummah is a virtual one: all crimes 
(depicted through gruesome videos) committed against 
Muslims anywhere in the world are put on the same level. 
These stories are not contextualised: the picture of a 
tortured man could come from Bosnia, Chechnya or 
Kashmir. The ummah is presented as an undifferentiated 
whole. 
The second part of the narrative is centred on the 
individual who is suddenly put in the situation of 
becoming a hero who would avenge the sufferings of the 
community. It addresses an individual by combining 
different elements: 
•  Self-image: all personal humiliations or shortcomings 
are redeemed by the act of terrorism. The death is 
staged as is the self itself (hence the video, 
declaration, will, etc.).  
•  Salvation and death: there could be only one definite 
action that will turn the suicide bombers into a 
permanent icon; death is the definite seal on the 
story, it is part of the story. 
The third part of the narrative is the religious ‘qotbist’ 
dimension, which also plays its role here: jihad is a 
personal compulsory duty, the vanguard of the ummah is 
made of a few outstanding and devoted heroes; salvation 
is through sacrifice and death. Sources and authors who 
were seen by the ‘vertical view’ as of utmost importance 
make a comeback here: occasional references to Ibn 
Taymiyya, Said Qotb or Palestine may be called to 
illustrate the narrative. The narrative allows the would-be 
terrorist to connect with history and religious genealogy. 
But a fourth part of the narrative is less religious: it is the 
enactment of the fight against the global order. To people 
not specifically motivated by religion, Al Qaeda is the 
only organisation present on the market that seems to be 
effective in confronting the ‘evil’ that is the West. The 
fact that AQ is constantly presented by Western leaders 
as the biggest threat gives more value to the decision to 
join it. The narrative is substantiated by the Western 
reaction to it. 
Al Qaeda gives a meaning to the flow of information that 
comes from the media, describing a world of violence, 
explosions, blood and wars. Al Qaeda presents its action 
as some sort of a video game, where youngsters can 
easily identify themselves as actors. Al Qaeda also makes 
use of the dominant discourse on the clash of civilisation 
by inversing the values. It fits with the division of the 
world into two competing principles, good and evil. AQ 
plays on the mirror effect: we are what you say we are, 
that is your worst enemy, and the proof is not what we 
do, but what you say. 
With respect to these four dimensions of the narrative, it 
is clear that Al Qaeda would not have such an impact 
without the amplification effect of the media and without 
its constant assimilation with THE evil alternative to 
civilisation. 
Deradicalisation 
The most effective way to combat terrorism is a 
combination of two levels: one level employs traditional 
intelligence and legal techniques to trace and neutralise 
cells and networks. But it is very difficult to prevent 
young guys from suddenly leaping into violence who 
have previously shown no inclination to do so. The very 
nature of AQ-related violence makes it difficult to pre-
empt radical action. The second level would hence be to 
destroy AQ’s narrative, that is, to de-legitimise it. 
We should stop endorsing the mirror effect that is playing 
alongside AQ’s words. As mentioned earlier, AQ’s main 
assertions are: 
1)  AQ is the vanguard and the paroxysm of the ‘Muslim 
wrath’. 
2)  Terrorists are heroes. 
3)  AQ embodies radical Islam, or more precisely 
“radically” embodies Islam. 
To nullify the first statement, we should stop speaking of 
Muslims through the lens of terrorism, and should 
establish a coherent long-term process of integration of 
Islam as simply a religion in a Western context. To 
destroy the second assertion, we should stress the real 
nature of the radicals: not powerful devils, but petty and 
often unsuccessful delinquents, in a word, losers, who 
have no future. And by the way, this image already seems 
to be emerging: the repetitive dimension of AQ’s actions 
diminishes their power of fascination and attraction; the 
fact that there are more attempts that failed miserably (the 
attack on Glasgow airport, for example) stresses the 
growing vacuity of terrorism. For the third element, we 
should stop promoting ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ Islam, 
because it supports the idea that AQ is a religious 
organisation. AQ is not a religious organisation; it is not 
the armed branch of salafisme. And by the way, to 
promote ‘good Islam’ through governmental means is to 
give the kiss of death to ‘liberal’ Muslim thinkers. If AQ 
is a modern phenomenon and not the expression of 
fundamentalist Islam, there is no point in promoting 
modern liberal Islam against AQ. The process of 
secularisation or accommodation of Islam in the West 
may take place, but to be successful it should be 
undertaken outside the anti-terrorism framework.  8 | Olivier Roy 
We should address the other issues related to second- 
generation Muslims (crimes of honor, salafisme) as they 
are, i.e. a socio-cultural transition, and not as harbingers 
of terrorism. We should de-Islamise AQ – not demonise 
it as ‘bad Islam’. That is what secularism means. 
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